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Abstract 
The paper contributes to the empirics of aid and growth by taking a fresh look at the 
aid-policies-growth nexus emanating from the very influential but also debatable paper 
on the subject by Burnside and Dollar: ‘Aid, Policies and Growth’. We employ three 
different datasets (including the one used in the Burnside and Dollar paper) and 
Bayesian instrumental variable methods to test the robustness of the central finding of 
the Burnside and Dollar paper related to the aid and policy interaction coefficient. In 
doing so, we applied Bayesian instrumental variable techniques to find the most 
probable parameter values in the growth equation. We also test for the exogeneity of 
the  instrumental variables used. We find that the marginal effect of the disputed 
(Aid/GDP) x Policy variable on real per capita GDP growth is substantially smaller than 
in Burnside and Dollar, thus casting serious doubts on the robustness of their findings, 
and most importantly, on the validity of the policy lessons emerged from the Burnside-
Dollar study. 
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The aid and growth empirics are as old as aid-giving itself. Indeed, for almost five 
decades numerous empirical studies have tried in various ways to analyse the impact of 
aid on growth in aid-recipient countries and thus shed light on the crucial issue of aid 
effectiveness. For many years the empirical literature on the effectiveness of aid 
remained inconclusive partly due to lack of good data on aid but also partly due to 
inappropriate econometrics and simplistic empirical specifications employed in most of 
the empirical studies.1 Recent years, however, have witnessed important changes in the 
aid arena2 which inter alia revived the interest in aid effectiveness issues. Needless to 
say, current discussion (and debate) on how the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) can be achieved has generated additional interest in aid effectiveness issues. 
One of these changes is related to the focus of the research and policy aid community on 
the impact of domestic policies in recipient countries on the overall aid-growth nexus. 
In this regard, the turning point in the aid-growth empirics was the Burnside and Dollar 
seminal paper published in the American Economic Review in 2000 (in fact an earlier 
version by the same authors was published in 1997 as a background paper for the World 
Bank study Assessing Aid (1998)). One of the key conclusions of the Burnside and 
Dollar (2000: 847) paper is that aid works better in countries with sound policy regimes 
and more precisely that ‘…. aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries 
with good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor 
policies’. The central finding of the Burnside and Dollar study is that aid works only in 
a good policy environment. Consequently it has been very influential among donor 
agencies since it provided the donor community with an important policy criterion for 
allocating aid, namely that aid should be given on a selective basis to countries that have 
adopted good policies.3 
At the same time, the Burnside and Dollar study has mobilized a relatively large and 
still growing empirical literature trying to delve deeper in the aid-policies-growth nexus 
emphasized by these authors. Many studies have seriously questioned the validity of the 
empirical results (and thus the policy lessons emerging from the Burnside and Dollar 
study) on grounds such as inappropriate econometrics, problematic definition of the 
‘policy’ variable, inappropriate specification of the empirical model, endogeneity issues, 
etc.4  
                                                 
1   It is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to review the vast early literature of the aid-growth 
empirics. Tarp (2000); Mavrotas (2000); Beynon (2002); McGillivray (2003); Collier and Dollar 
(2004) and Addison, Mavrotas and McGillivray (2005) provide recent assessments of the aid 
effectiveness literature; see also Mosley (1987); White (1992) and Cassen (1994) on earlier reviews of 
the above literature. 
2   Burnell (2004) provides a fascinating discussion of the changing landscape of aid in the 1990s; see 
also Addison, Mavrotas and McGillivray (2005). 
3   See Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002); Beynon (2002, 2003); McGillivray (2003) and Munro (2005) on 
the selectivity issue. 
4  See Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001); Dalgaard and Hansen (2001); Lensink and White (2001); 
Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) and more recently Dayton-Johnson and Hoddinot (2003); Denkabe 
(2004); Chauvet and Guillaumont (2004); Dalgaard, Hansen and. Tarp (2004) and Ram (2004).  
2 
In a recent critique, Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) convincingly show, by 
adding four more years (1994-97) to the original dataset, that the finding regarding the 
aid-policy interaction is not robust to the use of these additional data, thus casting 
serious doubts on the policy implications emanating from the Burnside and Dollar 
study.  
The present paper takes a fresh look at the aid-growth empirics by adding a new 
methodological dimension to the Burnside and Dollar paper and the overall aid-growth 
empirics. More precisely, we use three different datasets (including the one used in the 
Burnside and Dollar paper) and Bayesian instrumental variable methods to test the 
robustness of the central finding relating to the aid and policy interaction coefficient. In 
doing so, we apply Bayesian instrumental variable techniques to obtain the most 
probable parameter values in the growth equation. Similarly to the approach adopted in 
Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004), we do not deviate from the Burnside and Dollar 
specification since our primary focus is to test its central empirical finding without 
employing a different specification. We also test for the exogeneity of the instrumental 
variables used. We find that the problematic interaction term of aid and policy is not 
statistically significant in the model even with the heteroscedastic-consistent estimator, 
and most importantly, its marginal effect on real per capita GDP growth is substantially 
smaller than in the Burnside and Dollar (2000) paper. This obviously raises important 
questions regarding the robustness of the Burnside-Dollar findings and the validity of 
the crucial policy implications emerging from their study. 
In the classical inference theory, a sufficient number of observations is more important 
than in Bayesian statistics, and the efficiency of the estimator is greater when a large 
number of observations is available. This is because the classical theory of inference is 
based on asymptotic properties. Furthermore, there is a conceptual difference between 
the classical school and the Bayesians regarding the interpretation of the parameter 
estimates and confidence intervals. For instance, the Bayesian posterior interval 
estimate gives us a specified probability g that parameter value, say θ, lies in that 
confidence interval conditional on the observed data. Thus, the confidence interval in 
the classical theory is similar to the Bayesian case, but its interpretation is different—it 
is considered as a random interval so that the probability it contains, the unknown 
parameter θ, has a specified confidence coefficient for all possible values of θ. This 
implies that according to the classical theorists, a confidence interval can be obtained if 
the calculations are repeated many times or really a large dataset is available. But even 
then, there is no guarantee that the calculated confidence interval would contain the 
unknown parameter value θ. This, however, is not the case in the Bayesian theory of 
inference, as explained above.5 
Despite these advantages, the Bayesian estimation methods face the same problems as 
their classical counterpart: for instance, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity issues must 
be addressed in order to obtain consistent and efficient parameter estimates. The 
selection of instrumental variables also needs to be addressed since the consistency of 
the values of the parameters of interest depends on the instrumental variables used. 
Against this background, we apply in this paper a Bayesian two-stage estimation 
method to the Burnside and Dollar (2000) regressions, and we also test for the 
                                                 
5   See O’Hagan (1988) and Zellner (1971) for a detailed discussion of the Bayesian approach.  
3 
exogeneity of the instruments, both for the Burnside and Dollar (2000) data and the 
extended datasets.  
2 Econometric  methodology 
The methodology employed in this paper builds on Luoma, Luoto and Siivonen (2003) 
and Kleibergen and Zivot (2003). It is noted that Luoma, Luoto and Siivonen 
(2003) allow for heteroscedasticity contrary to the Kleibergen and Zivot (2003) paper.  
Burnside and Dollar (2000) use an unbalanced dataset for 56 countries and six periods 
starting from 1970-73 to 1990-93, i.e., 275 observations. They estimate a growth model 
by employing Equations 1 and 2 below. In doing so, they use heteroscedastic-consistent 
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where i stands for countries and t for time, git represents per capita real GDP growth, yit 
is the logarithm of initial real per capita GDP, and ait represents aid receipts relative to 
GDP. pit is a P x 1 vector of policies that affect growth, zit is a K x 1 vector of other 
exogenous variables, at and gt represent fixed-time effects. The expected value of the 
error terms 
g
it ε  and 
a
it ε  is conventionally zero. 
In order to estimate the parameter values of growth Equation (1), we employ a limited 
information simultaneous equation model in the form: 
y1 = Y2β + Zγ + ε1,   (3) 
Y2 = XΠ + ZΓ + V2.   (4) 
We then assume that there is an unbalanced collection of time observations for   
N individuals Ti observations for each, and due to the unbalanced data we have total 





i T n.  T h e n  y 1 is an n x 1 vector and Y2 is an n x (m-1) 
matrix of endogenous variables—there are in all m endogenous variables in the model. 
Z is an n x k1 matrix of included exogenous variables. X is an n x k2 matrix for excluded 
exogenous variables (i.e., instruments), and ε1 is an n x 1 vector of structural errors.  
V2  is an n  x  (m-1) matrix of reduced-form errors. The parameters of interest are in   
(m-1) x 1 vector β and k1 x 1 vector γ. Matrices X and Z are assumed to be of full rank, 
uncorrelated with ε1 and V2, and weakly exogenous with regard to the parameter β.  
The elements ε1i of ε1 and the rows V2i of V2 are assumed to be normally distributed 
with zero mean and m x m covariance matrix: 
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4 
Note that the coefficient λi accounts for heteroscedasticity where i = 1, …, N. 
Substituting the reduced-form equation of Y2 in (4) in Equation (3) for y1 gives us the 
unrestricted reduced-form (URF) of the model in Equations (6) and (7). The URF form 
expresses endogenous variables as a linear function of the exogenous variables and is 
given by: 
y1 = Wδ + v1,   (6) 
Y2 = UB + V2,   (7) 
where W = (UB Z), δ = (β´ γ´)´, U = (X Z), B = (Π´ Γ´)´ and v1 = ε1 + V2β.  
Now we have 



















12 11 . Using basic matrix calculus we find that 
2 . 11 ω 21
1
22 12 11 Ω Ω Ω − ϖ =
− . Luoma, Luoto and Siivonen (2003) follow Kleibergen and 
Zivot (2003) by setting the identifying restriction φ =  21
1
22Ω Ω
−  which implies that 
e1 = v1 - V2φ and V2 are independent and var(e1i) = λi 2 . 11 ω . 
The likelihood function for the Bayesian two-stage model with heteroscedasticity 
correction (B2SH) is:  
L = P(Y2|X, Z, θ)P(y1|Y2, X, Z, θ) (8) 
where the parameter vector θ contains all model parameters.  
Explicit forms of likelihood functions for P(Y2|X, Z, θ) and P(y1|Y2, X, Z, θ) are  
P(y1|Y2, X, Z, θ) ∝ 






− ω  (y1-Wδ-V2φ)´ Λ
-1(y1-Wδ-V2φ)}   (9) 
and 





− Ω (Y2-UB)´ Λ
-1(Y2-UB)}   (10) 
respectively. 
The diagonal matrix Λ is an n  x  n covariance-variance matrix consisting of 
heteroscedasticity correction parameters, i.e., Λ = diag(λi); λi = exp(ξzi)6 where zi is a 
variable possibly identical to some other variable(s) in the model as argued in Luoma, 
Luoto and Siivonen (2003). Following Luoma, Luoto and Siivonen (2003) we also use 
Jeffrey’s non-informative prior distributions7 for the model parameters to obtain 
posterior distributions. The prior and posterior distributions of parameters are shown in 
                                                 
6   The variable zi should not be confused with the notation used in Equation (1). 
7   We use non-informative prior information since we want to keep the analysis as objective as possible.  
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Appendix II. The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (see Robert and Casella 1999) is used 
to make draws from the joint posterior p.d.f for B and ξ. The convergence of the 
Markov chain is controlled visually. 
3  Data issues and empirical results 
We use three datasets to estimate the parameter values of Equations 1 and 2 above. The 
dataset labelled as A8 is the Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) counterpart of the 
original Burnside and Dollar (2000) panel dataset for 56 countries and six 4-year 
periods from 1970 to 1993. Although the dataset is not identical, Easterly, Levine and 
Roodman (2004) have managed to replicate the Burnside-Dollar results. The dataset 
labelled as B is a panel dataset for the original Burnside and Dollar (2000) countries 
(excluding Somalia (SOM) and Tanzania (TZA)) over the period 1970-2001, consisting 
of eight 4-year periods. In total, dataset B has 374 observations for 54 countries while 
the Burnside and Dollar dataset A has 275 observations with outliers included. Panel 
dataset C contains in total 448 observations for 69 countries covering the same time 
period as dataset B. Appendix I provides details on how these datasets have been 
constructed as well as information on definition of variables and relevant data   
sources. Table 2 in Appendix I lists the countries and time periods covered in datasets 
A, B and C. Note that outliers9 are excluded only from dataset A and neither outlier 
detection nor exclusion methods are undertaken for datasets B and C.  
In what follows, we estimate the parameter values for regressions 4 and 5 of Table 4 in 
Burnside and Dollar study (2000), in which regression 4 also includes the disputed 
(Aid/GDP)
2 x Policy variable, whereas it is dropped from regression 5 since it was 
found to be not significant in regression 4.  
The policy index has been constructed as in Burnside and Dollar (2000). Parameter 
values for the policy index for datasets A, B and C10 are given below and full 
estimation results without the estimated effects of time dummies of regression 1 are 
reported in Table 3 in Appendix III for all datasets.11 For the countries included in 
datasets B and C, we use the following linear combinations to depict the policy 
conditions at given time period: 
Dataset B: PolicyB = 1.428 + 5.213*Budget Surplus (BB) – 2.142*Inflation (INFL)  
+ 1.515*Openness (SACW). 
                                                 
8   Estimation results reported in Appendix III are obtained using datasets A, B and C. The data source 
for dataset A is Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004). Datasets B and C are obtained using the data 
from Roodman (2004). 
9   Burnside and Dollar (2000) drop Gambia in 1986-89 and 1990-93, Guyana in 1990-93 and Nicaragua 
in 1986-89 and 1990-93 from their sample. 
10 The parameter values used in Burnside and Dollar (2000) to derive the policy index are 1.28, 6.85, 
-1.40 and 2.16, where 1.28 is the parameter value of the constant. 
11 Although our estimate regarding the effect of the fast growing Asia countries is marginally lower than 
Burnside and Dollar (2000), overall we do manage to replicate their results of regression 1 in Table 3 
using dataset A constructed by Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004). The parameter signs for 
datasets B and C are the same and the levels of marginal effects are similar to those for dataset A.  
6 
Dataset C: PolicyC = 1.746 + 6.634*Budget Surplus (BB) – 2.161*Inflation (INFL)  
+ 1.088*Openness (SACW). 
Estimation results for the Burnside-Dollar regressions 4 and 5 using samples A, B and C 
are reported in Tables 4a and 4b in Appendix III. The dependent variable is the real per 
capita GDP growth and the results are reported without time dummies. B2S stands for 
the Bayesian two-stage estimator without heteroscedasticity correction, B2SH is the 
B2S with heteroscedasticity-consistent values. We obtain the results reported in 
Tables  4a and 4b by employing the year 1970 GDP values in natural logarithm to 
account for heteroscedasticity of the form Cov((y1, Y2)i | Xi, Zi, θ) = exp(ζzi)Σi. The 
assumption is that initial GDP per capita levels lead to heterogeneous real per capita 
GDP growth paths. 
We draw 20,000-90,000 samples from the conditional posterior distribution of the 
parameters in Equation (1). We set the burn-in period12 to the tenth of the sample length 
to ensure as noiseless statistical inference as possible. The simulated parameter values 
are the calculated medians of the simulated densities13 and thus they are the most 
probable values for the parameter estimates of the given variables. The lower and the 
upper bounds for the 95 per cent posterior probability interval are reported in brackets 
below the parameter estimate values. The interpretation of this parameter probability 
interval is that, given the dataset, 95 per cent of all possible parameter values lie in this 
region.  
Regarding the exogeneity of the instrumental variables we would like to stress that the 
application of the Stock and Yogo (2002) method for testing weak instruments in the 
data used in regression 4 indicates that this hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5 per 
cent level.14 The problem is not as severe for the data related to regression 5: allowing 
for a slightly higher bias in the parameter estimates leads us to reject the hypothesis of 
weak instruments at the 5 per cent level.  
Turning to the empirical results reported in Table 4a, it is evident that estimation with 
the homoscedastic errors assumption produces parameter estimates with the same signs 
as in Burnside and Dollar (2000). However, the levels of marginal effects change 
slightly. The variable measuring institutional quality (ICRGE) and the Sub-Saharan 
dummy are the only statistically significant variables in these regressions. It is also 
noteworthy that the parameter values of the variables (Aid/GDP)  x  Policy and 
(Aid/GDP)
2 x Policy become significant in dataset B but lose their significance again 
when regression 4 is estimated using dataset C.  
Heteroscedasticity-consistent estimation leads to somewhat different findings in 
connection with regression 4. The 95 per cent posterior probability interval for the 
heteroscedasticity parameter does not contain zero and hence heteroscedasticity is 
significant. Negative values of the heteroscedasticity parameter indicate that random 
                                                 
12 The purpose of the burn-in period is to account for possible non-stationary values. 
13 To account for a possible bias due to the Markov chain, we utilize every 5th value.  
14 In the regressions, there are three and two endogenous variables included, respectively, i.e., Aid/GDP, 
(Aid/GDP) x Policy and (Aid/GDP)
2 x Policy in regression 4 and Aid/GDP and (Aid/GDP) x Policy 
in regression 5.  
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growth opportunities are less probable in high GDP per capita growth countries. 
Although not a statistically significant finding in itself, what is striking is the result that 
the initial GDP variable shows a positive parameter value when dataset B is used in 
regression 4. 
In Table 4b we report results for regression 5 in Burnside and Dollar (2000). This 
regression does not contain the (Aid/GDP)
2 x Policy variable and thus the number of 
variables to be instrumented is lower. The institutional quality and the policy index 
variables are the only ones having a statistically significant marginal effect on the GDP 
per capita growth while the East Asia dummy becomes significant when dataset C is 
used in the estimation. Similarly, the negative effect of the Sub-Saharan dummy 
becomes significant when datasets B and C are used. Overall, the signs of the 
parameters remain the same as in Burnside and Dollar (2000) except for the sign of the 
interaction of ethnic fractionalization and assassinations. 
However, the magnitude of the parameter values changes dramatically when a new 
dataset is employed in the estimation. It becomes clear that even though the effect of the 
aid-policy interaction term is not statistically significant, it is more than two times 
smaller than the coefficient reported in Burnside and Dollar (2000). It is, therefore, 
evident that the aid-policy interaction term does not have an effect on GDP growth, and 
this is in sharp contrast to the central conclusion emerging from Burnside and Dollar. 
Under heteroscedasticity-consistent estimation, we note that the simulated density 
functions of the parameter of the aid x policy variable are all symmetric but the variance 
of the parameter is estimated slightly higher with dataset A as compared to datasets B 
and C. On the contrary, the kurtosis of density function for the values of this parameter 
is larger for datasets B and C. Similarly to regression 4 results, we get statistically 
significant negative values for the heteroscedasticity parameter. In fact, the effect of the 
aid and policy interaction term is quite similar to the one reported by Easterly, Levine 
and Roodman (2004) for their expanded dataset. 
4 Sensitivity  analysis 
In this section we conduct a sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of our results in 
Tables 4a and 4b. The sensitivity results are reported in Tables 5a and 5b in 
Appendix III. In Table 5a and 5b, we re-run the earlier regressions with the policy index 
(Policy) constructed in such a way that the variable weights for inflation (INFL), 
openness (SACW) and budget surplus (BB) have exactly the same values as in Burnside 
and Dollar (2000). In addition, we use GDP per capita values for both 1970 and 1982 to 
capture heteroscedasticity.  
The sensitivity of the results of B2S estimation to change in the policy index weights for 
both regression 4 and 5 is much smaller than the sensitivity of the results attained with 
the B2SH estimator. Our results show that the B2SH results for regression 4 are 
sensitive both to the weights used in the policy index and to the values of the variable 
used to account for heteroscedasticity. For instance, when we use the 1970 GDP per 
capita values to account for heteroscedasticity, we find that the effect of 
(Aid/GDP)
2 x Policy on GDP per capita growth is zero. However, this coefficient gets 
its expected value when the year 1982 GDP per capita values are used to account for 
heteroscedasticity.   
8 
Finally, regression results for regression 5 in Table 4b are sensitive to the value of the 
initial GDP per capita used to account for heteroscedasticity—the GDP per capita 
values for the year 1982 in dataset B change the sign of the convergence parameter to 
positive, but this is no longer the case when the much broader dataset C is used.  
5 Concluding  remarks 
In this paper we have tried to contribute to the recent empirical literature on aid and 
growth by taking a fresh look at the aid-policies-growth nexus emanating from the very 
influential but also debatable seminal paper by Burnside and Dollar (2000).  
We employ three different datasets (including the one used in the Burnside and Dollar 
paper) and Bayesian instrumental variable methods to test for the robustness of the 
central finding of the Burnside and Dollar paper with regard to the aid and policy 
interaction coefficient. In doing so, we apply Bayesian instrumental variable techniques 
to find the most probable parameter values in the growth equation. We also test for the 
exogeneity of the instrumental variables used.  
Although the weights used in the construction of the policy variable seem to some 
extent to have an impact on the results, we can clearly conclude that the marginal effect 
of the disputed (Aid/GDP)  x  Policy variable on real per capita GDP growth is 
substantially smaller than in Burnside and Dollar (2000), thus casting serious doubts on 
the robustness of their findings, and most importantly, on the validity of the policy 
lessons emerged from their study. At the same time, our findings echo recent concern 
over the Burnside-Dollar results by Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) who, by 
extending the original Burnside and Dollar dataset by four years, have reached the same 
conclusion. The paper clearly demonstrates that the aid-growth empirics is still an area 
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Appendix I  
Dataset A 
Description of dataset A can be found in Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) on 
page 3. Their data can be downloaded at www.cgdev.org. We use variables denoted 
‘BD’—Burnside and Dollar. 
Data construction for sets B and C 
Datasets B and C are collected from the data sheet in Roodman (2004) and are based on 
datasets used in Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004). Roodman’s (2004) dataset can 
also be downloaded at www.cgdev.org. Note that some variables have been revised by 
Roodman (2004). Other elements have been added to match the datasets of the tested 
regressions. The time period covered has been extended to 2001 for most variables. All 
data were collected from standard cross-country sources (see Table 1 below). In what 
follows, we provide further information on the construction of the dataset.
15 
(a)  Revisions since Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) 
(from Burnside and Dollar (2000) dataset) 
−  Some observations for inflation were completed with wholesale inflation where 
consumer price inflation was unavailable.  
−  The update of the Sachs-Warner variable was slightly revised, influenced by the 
independent update by Wacziarg and Welch (2002).  
−  Missing values for Effective Development Assistance (EDA) during 1975-95: 
the period of the EDA dataset was filled in in a manner similar to the method 
used for filling the missing values outside this period, via a regression of EDA 
on net ODA.  
−  ICRGE now varies over time, instead of taking the 1982 values throughout. 
Observations before 1982 were assigned 1982 values. In addition, the variable 
was revised in order to extend it beyond 1997. In 1998, the PRS Group stopped 
reporting two of ICRGE’s original components, ‘expropriation risk’ and 
‘repudiation of government contracts’, so these were dropped entirely from 
ICRGE, leaving ‘corruption’, ‘bureaucratic quality’, and ‘rule of law’. On 
annual data, the revised ICRGE has a 0.97 correlation with the original.  
−  Missing values for ethnolinguistic fractionalization were filled in from Roeder 
(2001).  
(b) Expansion of period  
−  The original Roodman (2004) data were collected for all available years over 
1958-2001 but here only data for the period 1970-2001 are used.  
−  The 1998-2001 values for the updated Sachs-Warner variable are based on 1998 
data only. Currency Data International, a long-time source of black market 
premium data, which is one component of Sachs-Warner, shut down in 1999.  
                                                 
15 These notes are based on Roodman (2004) and modified where appropriate.  
 
Table 1 
Definitions of variables and data sources for datasets B and C 
Variables Code  Data  source  Notes 
Per capita GDP growth  GDPG  World Bank (2003)   
Initial GDP per capital  LGDP  Summers and Heston (1991) 
updated using GDPG 




ETHNF  Roeder (2001)  Probability that two individuals will belong to different ethnic groups. 
Assassinations per capita  ASSAS  Banks (2002)  Assassinations per capita. 
Institutional quality   ICRGE  PRS Group’s IRIS III dataset 
(see Knack and Keefer 1995) 
Revised version of the variable. Computed as the average of the three 
components still reported after 1997. 
M2/GDP, lagged one period  M2-1  World Bank (2003)   
Sub-Saharan Africa  SSA  World Bank (2003)  Codes nations in the southern Sahara as Sub-Saharan.  
East Asia  EASIA    Dummy for China, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand, following Burnside and Dollar. 
Budget surplus  BB  World Bank (2003); IMF (2003)  World Bank primary data source. Additional values extrapolated from IMF, 
using series 80 and 99b (local currency budget surplus and GDP). 
Inflation  INFL  World Bank (2003); IMF (2003)  Natural logarithm of 1+inflation rate. World Bank primary data source. 
Wholesale price inflation from IMF used where consumer price data 
unavailable. 
Sachs-Warner, updated  SACW  Sachs and Warner (1995); Easterly, 
Levine and Roodman (2004); Wacziarg 
and Welch (2002) 




AID  Chang, Fernandez-Arias and Serven 
(1998); DAC (2002); IMF (2003); World 
Bank (2003); Summer and Heston (1991) 
Available values for 1975-95 from Chang, Fernandez-Arias and Serven. 
Missing values extrapolated based on regression of EDA on net ODA. 
Converted to 1985 dollars with World Import Unit Value index from IMF, 
series 75. GDP computed similarly to LGDP above.  
Population  LPOP  World Bank (2003)  Natural logarithm of population. 
Arms imports/total imports 
lagged 
ARMS-1  US Department of State (various years)   







Countries and time-periods covered in datasets A, B and C 
  C  B  A  1970-73 1974-77 1978-81 1982-85 1986-89 1990-93 1994-97 1998-01 
Argentina  ARG  ARG  ARG  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Burkina Faso  BFA    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bulgaria BGR            1 1 
Bolivia  BOL  BOL  BOL  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Brazil  BRA  BRA  BRA  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Botswana  BWA  BWA  BWA   1 1*  1*  1*  1 1 1 
Chile  CHL  CHL  CHL  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
China CHN          1 1 1 1 
Cote  d'Ivoire  CIV  CIV  CIV     1*  1 1 1 1 1 
Cameroon  CMR  CMR  CMR    1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Congo, Rep.  COG           1 1 1 
Colombia  COL  COL  COL  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Costa  Rica  CRI  CRI  CRI  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Cyprus CYP        1 1 1 1 1 1 
Dominican  Republic  DOM  DOM  DOM  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Algeria  DZA  DZA  DZA  *  *      1  1 
Ecuador  ECU  ECU  ECU  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Egypt,  Arab  Rep. EGY  EGY  EGY    1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Ethiopia  ETH  ETH  ETH       1*  1*  1 1 1 
Gabon  GAB  GAB  GAB  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1*     
Ghana  GHA  GHA  GHA  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1   
Gambia  GMB  GMB  GMB  1* 1* 1* 1* *  1*     
Guatemala  GTM  GTM  GTM  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Guyana  GUY  GUY  GUY  *  *   * * * * 1   
Honduras  HND  HND  HND  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Haiti  HTI  HTI  HTI  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1  1 
Hungary HUN          1 1 1 1 
Indonesia  IDN  IDN  IDN  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
India  IND  IND  IND  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 






Table 2 (con’t) 
Countries and time-periods covered in datasets A, B and C 
  C  B  A  1970-73 1974-77 1978-81 1982-85 1986-89 1990-93 1994-97 1998-01 
              
Iran, Islamic Rep.  IRN        1 1 1 1 1 1 
Jamaica  JAM  JAM  JAM   1*  1*  1*  1 1 1 
Jordan JOR       1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Kenya  KEN  KEN  KEN  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Korea, Rep.  KOR  KOR  KOR  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1   
Sri  Lanka  LKA  LKA  LKA  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Morocco  MAR  MAR  MAR  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Madagascar  MDG  MDG  MDG  1* 1*      1* 1* 1  1 
Mexico  MEX  MEX  MEX  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Mali  MLI  MLI  MLI         1*  1 1 1 
Myanmar MMR    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Malawi  MWI  MWI  MWI      1* 1* 1* 1*     
Malaysia  MYS  MYS  MYS  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Niger  NER  NER  NER    1*  1*       
Nigeria  NGA  NGA  NGA  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Nicaragua  NIC  NIC  NIC  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Pakistan  PAK  PAK  PAK  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Peru  PER  PER  PER  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Philippines  PHL  PHL  PHL  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Papua New Guinea  PNG        1 1 1 1 1 1 
Poland POL            1 1 
Paraguay  PRY  PRY  PRY  1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1  1 
Romania ROM            1 1 
Senegal  SEN  SEN  SEN  1* 1* 1* 1*      1  1 
Singapore SGP    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 







Following Luoma, Luoto and Siivonen (2003), the conditional and marginal prior 
distributions for the parameters are: 
p(ξ) ∝ constant, 




− ω , 




p(φ|B, ξ, ω11.2, Ω22) ∝ 
) 1 m ( 5 . 0
2 . 11
− − ω |Ω22|
0.5. 
and 
p(δ|φ, B, ξ, ω11.2, Ω22) ∝ 
) 1 k m ( 5 . 0
2 . 11
1− + − ω |W´Λ
-1W|
0.5, where k = k1 + k2 i.e. the total 
number of exogenous variables in the model 
The joint prior distribution is obtained by multiplying the conditional and marginal 
prior together, and can be shown to be; 
p(δ, φ, B, ξ, ω11.2, Ω22) ∝ |Ω22|
-0.5(k+m-1) ) k m 2 ( 5 . 0
2 . 11





Using the product of the joint prior combined together with the likelihood function for 
the parameters (δ, φ, B, ξ, ω11.2, Ω22) we get the conditional and marginal posteriors 
of the parameters as follows: 
q(δ|φ, B, ξ, ϖ11.2, Ω22, y1, Y2, X, Z) ∝ 
) 1 k m ( 5 . 0
2 . 11






− ω (δ-δ ˆ )´W´Λ
-1W(δ-δ ˆ )}, 
q(φ|B, ξ, ω11.2, Ω22, y1, Y2, X, Z) ∝ 
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where  δ ˆ = (W´Λ
-1W)
-1W´Λ
-1(y1 – V2φ),  ϕ ˆ =(V2´Λ
-1MV2)
-1V2´Λ




-1, v = y1 – V2ϕ ˆ  and V2 = Y2 – UB. Due to the unknown functional 
form of q(B, ξ| y1, Y2, X, Z) we have to use the M-H algorithm to derive samples 









Policy index construction; estimation results for regression 1 in Burnside and Dollar (2000)  
   
 
 Regression  1 
 A  B  C 
Regressor    OLS OLS OLS 


































































      
Observations 275  374  448 
 Notes:  */** Significant at the 10/5 per cent level. Values in brackets are White heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors. 
  Dataset A is the Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) counterpart for the original Burnside 
and Dollar (2000) data. Dataset B extends the time period of dataset A by two periods for 
nearly the same countries (except Somalia and Tanzania). Dataset C contains more countries 
than datasets A and B. Variables in datasets B and C are revised versions of those in 
dataset A, see Appendix I.    
 
Table 4a 
Estimation results for regression 4 in Burnside and Dollar (2000)  
  Regression 4 
 A    B  C 
Regressor  BD 2SLS  B2S 95%  B2SH 95%  B2S 95%  B2SH 95%  B2S 95%  B2SH 95% 
Initial GDP  -0.71  -0.75  -0.80 -0.37  0.03 -0.63  -0.40 
      [-1.52; 0.10]  [-1.64; 0.03]  [-1.16;  0.38]  [-0.85;  0.83]  [-1.36;  0.10] [-1.39;  0.61] 
Ethnic fractionalization   -0.47  -0.51 -0.10  -0.27  0.17 -0.70  -0.33 
      [-2.19; 1.10]  [-1.95; 1.67]   [-1.69;  1.08] [-1.33; 1.73]    [-2.04; 0.74] [-2.43;  1.55] 
Assassinations -0.44  -0.45  -0.37 -0.37  -0.32 -0.34  -0.18 
  *  [-1.01; 0.12] [-0.94; 0.19] [-0.78; 0.08] [-0.76; 0.10] [-0.77; 0.12] [-0.72; 0.34] 
Ethnic fractionalization x assassinations 0.75  0.79  0.66  0.44 0.43  0.12  -0.30 
  *  [-0.39; 1.99] [-0.52; 1.92] [-0.52; 1.41] [-0.60; 1.44] [-0.87; 1.03] [-1.50; 0.88] 
Institutional quality  0.68  0.67 0.72  0.41 0.40  0.37 0.33 
  **  [0.31; 1.02] [0.30; 1.15] [0.20; 0.60] [0.18; 0.62] [0.17; 0.57] [0.00; 0.60] 
M2/GDP (lagged)  0.025  0.02  0.02 0.02  0.01 0.01  0.02 
    [0.00; 0.06] [-0.02; 0.06] [0.00; 0.05] [-0.17; 0.04] [-0.01; 0.03] [-0.03; 0.06] 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -1.71  -1.62 -1.93  -1.10 -1.33 -1.24  -1.44 
  **  [-3.10; -0.12] [-3.94; -0.23] [-2.15; -0.07] [-2.55; -0.16] [-2.33; -0.24] [-2.82; -0.10] 
East Asia  1.27  1.25 1.56  1.07 1.25  1.44 1.49 
  **  [-0.33; 2.83] [-0.06; 3.26] [-0.09; 2.33] [-0.04; 2.50] [0.35; 2.60] [0.11; 2.85] 
Policy Index  0.65  0.66  0.46  0.49 0.62  0.91 0.74 
  **  [-0.05; 1.37] [-0.27; 1.09] [0.05; 0.95] [0.18; 1.05] [0.41; 1.39] [0.02; 1.44] 
Aid/GDP -0.1  -0.12  -0.01  -0.37 -0.05  -0.32 -0.19 
    [-0.54; 0.31] [-0.52; 0.49] [-0.91; 0.10] [-0.69; 0.55] [-0.77; 0.132] [-0.97; 0.54] 
(Aid/GDP) x Policy  0.37  0.35  0.61  0.88  0.50 0.02  0.39 
    [-0.36; 1.05] [-0.21; 1.51] [0.26; 1.53] [-0.18; 1.24] [-0.55; 0.56] [-1.12; 1.77] 
(Aid/GDP)^2 x Policy  -0.038  -0.04  -0.07  -0.16  -0.08 0.01  -0.06 
    [-0.11; 0.04] [-0.18; 0.03] [-0.28; -0.04] [-0.22; 0.05] [-0.08; 0.11] [-0.31; 0.22] 
Heteroscedasticity parameter        -0.71    -0.66    -0.53 
      [-0.87;  -0.52]     [-0.81; -0.52]      [-0.66; -0.40] 
Observations  275  275     374     448   
Notes:  */** Significant at the 10/5 per cent level. B2S is the Bayesian two-stage estimator and B2SH is the B2S with heteroscedasticity correction. Parameter values in bold 
are statistically significant, i.e., lie on the 95 per cent posterior probability interval (lower and upper bounds given in brackets). The heteroscedasticity in B2SHs is 






Estimation results for regression 5 in Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
  A         B     C   
Regressor   BD 2SLS    B2S 95%  B2SH 95%    B2S 95%  B2SH 95%    B2S 95%  B2SH 95% 
                
Initial GDP  -0.9    -0.91  -0.87 -0.16  -0.04 -0.61  -0.47 
      [-1.8; -0.05]  [-1.81; 0.02]  [-0.95;  0.61] [-0.86;  0.79]  [-1.33;  0.11] [-1.30;  0.37] 
Ethnic fractionalization   -0.73    -0.72 -0.52  -0.38 -0.08 -0.71  -0.34 
      [-2.27; 0.90]  [-2.21; 1.20]  [-1.74;  0.99] [-1.55;  1.30]  [-2.13;  0.66] [-1.97;  1.03] 
Assassinations -0.41    -0.40  -0.34 -0.41  -0.37 -0.36  -0.24 
      [-1.00; 0.15]  [-0.85; 0.16]  [-0.86;  0.01] [-0.79;  0.03]  [-0.79;  0.11] [-0.68;  0.21] 
Ethnic fractionalization x assassinations 0.71    0.71  0.68  0.60 0.53  0.13  -0.15 
      [-0.46; 1.90]  [-0.48; 1.86]  [-0.33;  1.55] [-0.42;  1.52]  [-0.81;  1.07] [-1.09;  0.86] 
Institutional quality  0.66    0.66 0.66  0.39 0.38 0.37  0.36 
 **    [0.33;  1.00]  [0.27;  1.03]  [0.18;  0.59]  [0.16;  0.59]  [0.18; 0.56]  [0.17; 0.57] 
M2/GDP (lagged)  0.017    0.02  0.00  0.02 0.01  0.01 0.01 
      [-0.02; 0.05]  [-0.03; 0.04]  [-0.01;  0.04] [-0.02;  0.04]  [-0.01;  0.03] [-0.01;  0.03] 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -1.29    -1.28  -1.44  -1.13 -1.21  -1.27 -1.40 
     [-2.81;  0.25]  [-3.47; 0.46]    [-2.16; -0.10]  [-2.31; -0.14]  [-2.26;  -0.26] [-2.41;  -0.30] 
East Asia  1.15    1.18 1.33  0.92 1.09  1.43 1.46 
 **    [-0.20;  2.61]  [-0.24;  2.88]  [-0.19;  2.06] [-0.16;  2.31]  [0.36; 2.55]  [0.30; 2.62] 
Policy Index  0.74    0.73 0.74  0.89 0.81 0.89  0.86 
 **    [0.18;  1.26]  [0.22;  1.26]  [0.51;  1.25]  [0.46;  1.16]  [0.51; 1.28]  [0.47; 1.26] 
Aid/GDP -0.32    -0.33  -0.10 -0.15  -0.04 -0.31  -0.19 
      [-0.96; 0.26]  [-0.94; 0.77]  [-0.60;  0.34] [-0.59;  0.52]  [-0.75;  0.16] [-0.77;  0.37] 
(Aid/GDP) x Policy  0.18    0.18 0.10  0.07 0.08 0.07  0.07 
  *    [-0.06; 0.43] [-0.18; 0.40] [-0.09;  0.23] [-0.08; 0.26] [-0.09; 0.25] [-0.10; 0.24] 
Heteroscedasticity parameter        -0.65    -0.45    -0.34 
       [-0.87;  -0.44]      [-0.61; -0.29]      [-0.48; -0.21] 
                
Observations  270   270     374     448   







 Sensitivity analysis regressions using dataset B 
  Regression 4        Regression 5     
Year of initial GDP per capita    1970  1982      1970  1982 
Regressor  B2S 95%  B2SH 95 %  B2SH 95%    B2S 95%  B2SH 95 %  B2SH 95% 
          
Initial GDP  -0.25  -0.05 0.138  -0.25  -0.17 0.062 
 [-1.02;  0.54]  [-0.88; 0.77]  [-0.75; 0.98]   [-1.00;  0.48]  [-1.03; 0.61]  [-0.77; 0.86] 
Ethnic fractionalization   -0.52  -0.11 -0.518  -0.48 -0.30 -0.64 
 [-1.99;  0.84]  [-1.57; 1.44]  [-1.98; 1.03]   [-1.83;  0.87]  [-1.81; 1.24]  [-2.08; 0.88] 
Assassinations  -0.45  -0.38 -0.405  -0.43  -0.40 -0.41 
 [-0.88;  -0.02]  [-0.82; 0.04]  [-0.83; 0.05]    [-0.87; -0.01] [-0.83;  0.07] [-0.86;  0.00] 
Ethnic fractionalization x assassinations 0.68  0.56  0.534  0.65 0.58 0.59 
 [-0.26;  1.61]  [-0.45; 1.54]  [-0.53; 1.58]   [-0.31;  1.61]  [-0.43; 1.58]  [-0.40; 1.60] 
Institutional quality  0.35 0.33 0.290  0.35 0.33 0.28 
  [0.13; 0.54]  [0.10; 0.56]  [0.05; 0.52]    [0.13; 0.56]  [0.11; 0.54]  [0.06; 0.49] 
M2/GDP (lagged)  0.03  0.02 0.010  0.03 0.02 0.01 
  [0.00; 0.05]  [0.00; 0.05]  [-0.02; 0.04]    [0.00; 0.05]  [0.00; 0.05] [-0.01;  0.04] 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.86  -0.92 -0.505  -0.88 -0.86 -0.47 
 [-1.93;  0.23]  [-2.12; 0.27]  [-1.84; 0.87]   [-1.94;  0.17]  [-1.91; 0.29]  [-1.70; 0.76] 
East Asia  0.70  0.89 1.244  0.72 0.80 1.10 
 [-0.51;  1.90]  [-0.41; 2.12]  [0.00; 2.47]   [-0.44;  1.23]  [-0.38; 1.98]  [-0.05; 2.23] 
Policy Index  0.88 0.81 0.731  0.85 0.84 0.83 
  [0.40; 1.36]  [0.36; 1.27]  [0.30; 1.22]    [0.46; 1.23]  [0.47; 1.21]  [0.46; 1.18] 
Aid/GDP -0.23  -0.08  0.149 -0.21  -0.16  0.05 
 [-0.72;  0.28]  [-0.66; 0.54]  [-0.72; 0.92]   [-0.71;  0.28]  [-0.74; 0.36]  [-0.64; 0.75] 
(Aid/GDP) x Policy  0.04  0.10 0.311  0.09 0.07 0.05 
 [-0.57;  0.66]  [-0.71; 0.92]  [-0.99; 1.44]   [-0.08;  0.26]  [-0.11; 0.24]  [-0.15; 0.25] 
(Aid/GDP)^2  x  Policy  0.01  0.00  -0.060  – – – 
  [-0.11; 0.12]  [-0.17; 0.15]  [-0.30;  0.23]       
Heteroscedasticity parameter    -0.65 -1.18     -0.42 -0.89 
   [-0.79;  -0.50]  [-1.32; -1.03]      [-0.57; -0.27] [-1.05;  -0.71] 
          
Observations  374 374 374    374 374 374 
Notes:   Weights for variables in policy index construction are the same as in Burnside and Dollar (2000). B2S is the Bayesian two-stage estimator and B2SH is the 
B2S with heteroscedasticity correction. Parameter values in bold are statistically significant, i.e., lie on the 95 per cent posterior probability interval. The lower 
and upper bounds of that interval are given in brackets. In B2SH estimation we use GDP per capita values for both 1970 and 1982 to capture 






Sensitivity analysis regressions using dataset C 
  Regression 4      Regression 5   
Year of initial GDP per capita    1970  1982      1970  1982 
Regressor  B2S 95%  B2SH 95 %  B2SH 95%    B2S 95%  B2SH 95 %  B2SH 95% 
          
Initial GDP  -0.75  -0.62 -0.79    -0.72  -0.55 -0.57 
 [-1.50;  -0.02]  [-1.59; 0.22]  [-1.68; 0.23]    [-1.43; -0.03] [-1.35;  0.24] [-1.47;  0.24] 
Ethnic fractionalization   -0.71  -0.10 -0.75    -0.76 -0.40 -0.71 
 [-2.04;  0.70]  [-1.89; 1.81]  [-2.56; 1.09]   [-2.17;  0.64]  [-1.90; 1.05]  [-2.33; 0.82] 
Assassinations -0.33  -0.22  -0.33   -0.35  -0.28  -0.32 
 [-0.79;  0.12]  [-0.71; 0.29]  [-0.90; 0.18]   [-0.80;  0.12]  [-0.73; 0.15]  [-0.78; 0.16] 
Ethnic fractionalization x assassinations 0.12  -0.15  0.07   0.15  -0.07  0.05 
 [-0.89;  1.09]  [-1.23; 0.95]  [-1.02; 1.20]   [-0.87;  1.08]  [-1.02; 0.89]  [-1.00; 1.04] 
Institutional quality  0.37 0.39 0.36    0.36 0.33  0.31 
  [0.16; 0.58]  [0.14; 0.67]  [0.06;  0.61]  [0.17;  0.56]  [0.12; 0.53]  [0.11; 0.51] 
M2/GDP (lagged)  0.01  0.01 0.02    0.02 0.01 0.01 
 [-0.01;  0.04]  [-0.03; 0.04]  [-0.02; 0.05]   [-0.01;  0.04]  [-0.01; 0.04]  [-0.01; 0.04] 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -1.09  -1.17 -1.02    -1.11 -1.20 -0.98 
 [-2.02;  -0.05]  [-2.36; 0.11]  [-2.26; 0.15]    [-2.13; -0.07]  [-2.30; -0.07] [-2.11;  0.12] 
East Asia  1.37  1.16 1.29    1.43 1.26 1.34 
 [0.20;  2.46]  [-0.19; 1.16]  [-0.10; 2.66]   [0.28;  2.51]  [0.09; 2.43]  [0.12; 2.45] 
Policy Index  0.70 0.85 0.70    0.65 0.72 0.72 
  [0.28; 1.11]  [0.35; 1.39]  [0.09;  1.21]  [0.27;  1.03]  [0.36; 1.1]  [0.33; 1.09] 
Aid/GDP  -0.44 -0.26 -0.47   -0.44  -0.29  -0.33 
 [-0.93;  0.07]  [-0.92; 0.40]  [-1.13; 0.23]   [-0.90;  0.04]  [-0.90; 0.33]  [-1.00; 0.33] 
(Aid/GDP) x Policy  0.04  -0.27 0.08    0.14 0.11 0.11 
 [-0.44;  0.52]  [-1.35; 0.73]  [-0.87; 1.20]   [-0.01;  0.30]  [-0.05; 0.28]  [-0.06; 0.28] 
(Aid/GDP)^2  x  Policy  0.02 0.07 0.01    –  –  – 
  [-0.06; 0.10]  [-0.11; 0.26] [-0.19;  0.17]         
Heteroscedasticity parameter    -0.39 -0.05     -0.34 -0.30 
   [-0.52;  -0.27]  [-0.18; 0.07]      [-0.46; -0.20] [-0.44;  -0.16] 
          
Observations  448 448 448    448 448  448 
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